This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021.
The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, computational aspects of games, markets and matchings, and social choice and cooperative games.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021.
The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, computational aspects of games, markets and matchings, and social choice and cooperative games.
Auctions and Mechanism Design.- Improved Two Sample Revenue
Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming.- The Price of
Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential
Auctions.- Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved
Approximation.- Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed
Facility Location.- Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with
Interdependent Values.- Incentive Compatible Mechanism for
Influential Agent Selection.- Computational Aspects of
Games.- On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for
Approximate Nash Equilibrium.- Prophet Inequality with Competing
Agents.- Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in
Lipschitz Games- Gerrymandering on graphs: Computational complexity
and parameterized algorithms.- Game theory on the blockchain: a
model for games with smart contracts.- Algorithmic Challenges in
Information Design XVII.- On the Complexity of Nucleolus
Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games.-Pure Nash Equilibria in
a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failures.-
Markets and Matchings.- On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable
Matching.- Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large
Markets.- Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget.-
Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets.- The Three-Dimensional Stable
Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences.-
Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many Strategic Agents
are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality?.- Social Choice
and Cooperative Games.- Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited
Information.- Hedonic Expertise Games.- When Dividing Mixed Manna
is Easier than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a
Constant Number of Chores.- Computing Fair and Efficient
Allocations with Few Utility Values.- An Approval-Based Model for
Single-Step Liquid Democracy.- Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness
and Welfare via Transfers.- Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy
has Bicriteria Guarantees.- Abstracts.- On Reward Sharing in
Blockchain Mining Pools.- On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and
Correlation Gap.- Vote Delegation and Misbehavio.
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