Table of Contents

*Frontmatter, pg. i*Contents, pg. vii*Preface and acknowledgments, pg. xi*Chapter 1. Backward induction, pg. 1*Chapter 2. Eliminating dominated strategies, pg. 37*Chapter 3. Nash equilibria, pg. 61*Chapter 4. Games in extensive form with incomplete information, pg. 88*Chapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria, pg. 114*Chapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria, pg. 151*Chapter 7. Symmetries of games, pg. 186*Chapter 8. Alternatives to the Nash equilibrium, pg. 203*Chapter 9. Differential equations, pg. 217*Chapter 10. Evolutionary dynamics, pg. 232*Appendix. Sources for examples and problems, pg. 265*References, pg. 269*Index, pg. 271

About the Author

Stephen Schecter is professor of mathematics at North Carolina State University. Herbert Gintis is external professor at the Santa Fe Institute. He is the author of Game Theory Evolving and The Bounds of Reason, and the coauthor (with Samuel Bowles) of A Cooperative Species (all Princeton).

Reviews

"Though not an advanced treatment mathematically speaking, readers become sophisticated consumers of game theories."--Choice "A welcome addition to the existing collection of introductory game theory texts... A very satisfying book."--Jennifer M. Wilson, MathSciNet "[A] wonderful introduction to game theory... I found almost all the games and examples fun to read and fun to work through the decisions and matrices. Whether the games were about politics, wine merchants and connoisseurs, or simply how to view sex ratios in society, you will find something of interest in this book."--David S. Mazel, MAA Reviews